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 According to the apocryphal (but believable) quote attributed 
to career bank robber Willie Sutton, he robbed banks because 
“that’s where the money is.”1  Mindful of the temptations large 
       †  Deputy Counsel, Rudy Giuliani Presidential Committee, and a veteran of 
four recounts of statewide elections in three states from 2004–2006.  Seattle 
University School of Law, J.D. cum laude, 1996.  Thanks to Julie Devine of Drexel 
University College of Law for her outstanding research assistance. 
 1. Steve Cocheo, The Bank Robber, the Quote, and the Final Irony, A.B.A. 
BANKING J., Mar. 1997, at 71, available at http://www.banking.com/ABA/profile 
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collections of money present, banks employ extensive security 
mechanisms to protect against Sutton’s progeny: vaults, cameras, 
alarms, guards, and more. 
For those who crave not wealth, but political power, another 
target beckons more forcefully than the bank: the election, which is 
where the votes are.  Recognizing this, states have adopted an 
extensive array of security mechanisms to protect elections against 
the progeny of Chicago’s first Mayor Daley, Louisiana’s Huey Long, 
and Texas’ John Connally.2
One protective measure used in a majority of states is to allow 
private actors, usually individual citizens or political parties, to 
monitor the election process in a sanctioned capacity.  In most 
states these private actors have official standing to affect the process 
by challenging voter registrations, voters, or absentee ballots.3  As 
candidates, political parties, and interest groups search for 
additional ways to influence electoral results, private monitoring is 
likely to become more prominent in future elections, as are 
disputes about its use. 
I. PRIVATE MONITORING’S PLACE IN THE SYSTEM 
Election systems are complex operations with many points 
where things can go wrong.  Election officials use audit procedures 
and technology to guard against fraud and errors.4  Sometimes 
these systems are effective, and at other times they are not.  When 
the stakes are high for a particular election, the candidates or 
political parties involved may seek judicial intervention to give 
them the right to monitor the process above and beyond what 
official procedures and their statutory rights provide.  Alternately, 
they may find on close scrutiny that their statutory rights are 
inadequate or ambiguous and ask a court to expand them so they 
are not left to rely on election officials to protect their interests.5  
Elections are hardly the only area where private parties play a role 
in monitoring and enforcement; many such rights exist in statute.6
0397.htm. 
 2. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Believe It or Not, Voting is Almost Free of Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at A10; Kaye Northcott, I Reminded Everybody of Lyndon, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, § 7, at 9. 
 3. See infra Parts II.C, III.D, and IV.C. 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.D. 
 6. See infra Part I.E. 
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A. Official Protections—Audit Proccesses and Technology 
States employ a wide array of tools to protect the integrity of 
elections.7  Tracking voters and ballots in the hundreds of 
thousands or even millions presents a challenge not unlike tracking 
the millions of packages shipped by FedEx or UPS or the billions of 
dollars that flow through a bank each day.  There must be a system 
to ensure that only eligible voters are able to cast ballots, that the 
number of ballots tabulated matches actual voters who voted, that 
ballots are secure from tampering, and that the tabulated results 
accurately reflect the will of the voters.  In almost every state, 
elections are administered at the county or town level, so there are 
thousands of different systems used around the country and a 
comparable number of different ways elections can succeed or fail. 
To detect problems in an election, administrators use an array 
of audit mechanisms.  Common audit tools include systems to 
record the number of ballots printed, used, and remaining; ballot 
accountability forms where precinct election workers reconcile the 
number of ballots with the number of voters signing in to vote; and 
tracking of absentee ballots received, counted, and rejected.8
In addition to audit tools, technology also plays a role in 
protecting election operations.  One major role for technology is in 
the processing and monitoring of absentee ballots.  Maricopa 
County, Arizona, has implemented a sophisticated system for 
producing and tracking absentee ballots that was recognized by the 
National Museum of American History in 2000.9  It is no accident 
that Maricopa County would be a leader when it comes to absentee 
ballots.  In the 2004 election, 41.5% of the county’s ballots—
503,516 out of 1,211,963—were cast as absentee votes.10  By 2006 
the percentage had climbed even higher, when 49.1% of 899,484 
 7. See MARIE GARBER, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, INNOVATIONS IN ELECTION 
ADMIN. 10: BALLOT SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1995), available at 
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/innovations-in-election-administration-
10-ballot-security-and-accountability. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Maricopa County Elections Vote-By-Mail in Smithsonian, http://recorder. 
maricopa.gov/htm/web7.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). 
 10. FINAL REPORT OF THE 2004 ELECTION DAY SURVEY, U.S. ELECTION 
ASSISTANCE COMM’N (2005) [hereinafter “FINAL REPORT”], available at 
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/clearinghouse/2004-election-day-survey/ 
(follow “State Data Tables” hyperlink, then select “Arizona_Jurisdictions.xls” 
spreadsheet, then select “Ballots Counted” and “Turnout Source” Tabs).  The 
Arizona spreadsheet lists Maricopa County’s absentee ballots as “early” ballots, 
because in Arizona absentee and early votes are cast using the same system. 
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ballots were cast as absentee.11  At this level, an error rate as small as 
one-half of one percent could affect 2500 votes in the county. 
Audit techniques and technology are needed to protect against 
two common problems with elections.  The first is simple error.  
With so many pieces of paper, and so many voters, and so many 
election workers involved, some degree of error is inevitable.  With 
many poll workers being temporary employees who only serve a few 
days a year, it is expected that the incidence of human error can be 
even higher.  Recognizing the tendency of mistakes to cloud 
election results, one election official noted that part of the reason 
machines are used to count ballots is precisely that a human being 
counting 500 pieces of paper might find 499 one day and 501 
another.12  When the task is keeping track of hundreds of 
thousands of ballots and making sure the number counted 
corresponds to the number validly cast, the risk of error is 
exponentially greater. 
The second reason for using audit techniques and technology 
is to protect elections against the Willie Sutton problem13—robbing 
votes.  For as long as there have been elections there have been 
efforts to manipulate them,14 so it is no surprise that complex and 
varied systems have developed to protect them. 
Effective auditing and accurate technological tools can detect 
fraud and, by increasing the likelihood of detection, deter it from 
occurring in the first place.  Sometimes official processes work to 
identify errors and fraud, and sometimes they do not. 
B. Official Protections—Success Stories 
The States of Washington and Missouri provide recent 
examples where official procedures worked to identify and address 
problems in the election system.  In Washington, employees of the 
 11. See Maricopa County Election Results, General Election, 11/07/2006, 
http://recorder.maricopa.gov/electionresults/electionresults06.aspx?election= 
GENERAL+ELECTION%2c+11%2f07%2f2006 (select “Registration and Turnout,” 
then select “All Voters”) (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). 
 12. Andrew Garber, Top Vote-Getter? We May Never Truly Know, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2004, at A1. 
 13. See Cocheo, supra note 1, at 71. 
 14. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638 
n.26 (2007) (providing examples of fraud concerns in the 20th century); E.S. 
STAVELY, GREEK AND ROMAN VOTING AND ELECTIONS 113–17 (1972) (stating it is 
likely that opportunities for deliberate fraud were numerous in the Greeks’ voting 
and allotment procedures). 
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Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
(ACORN) submitted more than 1700 fraudulent voter registration 
forms, an act the secretary of state called “the worst case of voter-
registration fraud in the history of the state . . . .”15  Election 
officials spotted the fraudulent submissions and initiated law 
enforcement actions that resulted in criminal charges against the 
organization (settled under a deferred prosecution agreement that 
included payment of $25,000 for investigative costs).16
In Missouri, several ACORN workers pleaded guilty to 
submitting false voter registration documents.17  As in Washington, 
election officials identified and prosecuted the fraud, and one of 
the workers was sentenced to 120 days in a halfway house.18
In another example, the county elections administrator in 
Bexar County, Texas acted to remove 330 non-citizens from the 
voter rolls.19  The individuals were discovered after they returned 
jury summonses to the court, claiming ineligibility because they 
were not citizens of the United States; nonetheless, they were 
already registered to vote.20  This is also an example of elections 
officials detecting and acting to correct a problem without 
intervention from private parties.  Unfortunately, the corrective 
action did not come in time to prevent forty-one of the non-citizens 
from voting in local, state, and federal elections.21
C. Official Protections—Failures 
Other examples inspire less confidence in official oversight of 
election processes.  When the initial vote count showed the 2004 
election for Governor of Washington separated by 261 votes out of 
nearly three million, investigators working for the political parties 
 15. Keith Ervin, Felony Charges Filed Against 7 in State’s Biggest Case of Voter-
Registration Fraud, SEATTLE TIMES, July 26, 2007 (quoting Secretary of State Sam 
Reed). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Mark Morris, ACORN Worker Enters Guilty Plea, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 7, 
2007, at B5; Mark Morris, Former ACORN Worker Pleads Guilty to Voter Registration 
Fraud, KAN. CITY STAR, May 17, 2007; Tony Rizzo, ACORN Worker Enters Guilty Plea, 
KAN. CITY STAR, June 7, 2007, at B3. 
 18. Woman Sentenced in Voter Fraud, KAN. CITY STAR, July 28, 2007, at B3. 
 19. Noncitizens Likely Voted in Bexar County, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 10, 
2007; Guillermo X. Garcia, Vote Fraud Probed in Bexar, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
June 9, 2007, at 1A. 
 20. Garcia, supra note 19. 
 21. See id. 
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learned that voters who had been issued provisional ballots22 in 
some counties were able to place those ballots directly into 
tabulators rather than returning them to elections officials for later 
verification as required by law.23
While the exact number of these errors was never found, the 
judge who heard the ensuing election contest found evidence that 
425 provisional ballots in two counties were placed in tabulators 
without first being verified.24  One reason this problem was 
detected was that political party observers in polling places on 
election day saw voters receive provisional ballots and place them 
directly in tabulators.25
In the 1996 election for the 46th Congressional District of 
California, Loretta Sanchez defeated incumbent Robert Dornan by 
984 votes.26  Dornan contested the election in the House of 
Representatives.27  The investigating committee found evidence of 
944 invalid votes, including 278 cast by immigrants who were 
registered to vote while attending classes preparing them to 
become American citizens.28  The committee determined that “had 
the Task Force and Committee not acted to consider the merits of 
this contest, significant vote fraud and vote irregularities would 
have gone undetected . . . .”29  In other words, the normal checks in 
the system did not catch them. 
A humorous attempt to highlight flaws in the election system 
led to official monitoring systems identifying a problem, but taking 
an embarrassingly long time to do it.  Jane Balogh of Federal Way, 
 22. Provisional ballots are issued to voters who arrive at a polling place and 
claim to be registered and eligible to vote, but whose names cannot be found on 
the list of registered voters at the polling place.  The completed provisional ballots 
are placed in envelopes with information about the voter.  If later review 
determines that the person who cast the ballot is in fact registered and eligible, the 
envelope is opened and the ballot is tabulated.  See U.S. Election Assistance 
Comm’n, Provisional Voting, http://www.eac.gov/election/practices/bpea/hava-
checklist/provisional/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). 
 23. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.207 (2006).  For a more detailed description of 
the errors, see Keith Ervin, Election Scrutiny Reveals Provisional-Vote Flaws, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005 [hereinafter Ervin, Election Scrutiny]; see also Keith Ervin, GOP 
Says Hundreds of Ballots Suspect, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005. 
 24. Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3, Court’s Oral Decision at 5 
(Wash. Chelan County Ct. June 6, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/ 
documentvault/CourtsOralDecision-629.pdf. 
 25. See Ervin, Election Scrutiny, supra note 23. 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 105-416, at 2 (1998). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 31−32, 35. 
 29. Id. at 16. 
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Washington, obtained telephone service in the name of her dog 
and used the phone bill to register the dog to vote.30  She then 
submitted absentee ballots in the dog’s name in three elections.31  
Her intention was not to cast fraudulent votes, but to point out the 
weaknesses in the voter registration system.32  To make this clear, 
she wrote “void” on the ballots, without marking any votes, and 
placed a paw print on the outside of the absentee ballot envelopes 
in the space for the voter’s signature.33  After the third time she sent 
in a ballot signed with a paw print, election officials contacted her 
and she was charged with making a false statement to a public 
official.34
As these examples show, relying on election officials to spot 
errors and fraud leads to mixed results.  Private monitoring of 
elections can supplement the work of public officials, whether it is 
performed by nonpartisan groups whose sole interest is the 
integrity of the process or by political parties and candidates 
playing roles in an adversary system. 
D. Seeking Judicial Rights to Private Party Monitoring 
The actors in the political process clearly believe that their 
ability to conduct private party monitoring of elections is 
important.  Sometimes, private parties turn to the courts to seek a 
right of participation where it is not guaranteed by law.  When 
Washington state election officials were organizing for a second 
recount of the state’s 2.8 million ballots in 2004, a dispute ensued 
over the right of campaign and party representatives to observe the 
count.35  With their candidate trailing after the first recount by 
forty-two votes, Democratic party officials petitioned the state 
supreme court for an order requiring county election officials to 
allow observers to see each individual ballot as it was recounted a 
 30. Keith Ervin, Woman Registers Her Dog to Vote; Prosecutors Growl,  SEATTLE 
TIMES, June 22, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/local 
news/2003758181_votingdog22m.html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; Keith Ervin, Deal Reached with Woman Who Registered Dog to Vote, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
localnews/2003871083_votingdog06m.html. 
 35. Brief and Amended Motion of Petitioners at 2, 5, McDonald v. Reed, 153 
Wash. 2d 201 (Wash. 2004) (No. 76321-6), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/ 
office/news_docs/Recount/Democrat/Amd%20Mot%20Brief.pdf. 
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second time.36  State statute created a general right to observe, but 
did not specify its extent.37  The court found the existing statutory 
language sufficient and declined the petition for additional 
observer rights.38
An interested party also asked a court to order more specific 
observer rights in the recount of the 2006 election for Vermont 
auditor of accounts.39  The court’s initial recount order stated, “The 
candidates . . . or their representatives and the general public, 
subject to reasonable restriction as may be imposed by the 
respective County Clerks, may attend but may not participate in the 
recount or impede it in any manner.”40  In a motion to the court, 
the Republican candidate (who led by 137 votes after the initial 
count) claimed that this order was being interpreted in some 
counties to mean that observers could not speak with the 
individuals conducting the recount.41  Those individuals were, by 
statute and the court’s recount order, appointed by the political 
parties having candidates in the election for auditor of accounts.42  
The court denied the request to clarify observers’ rights, leaving 
the matter to the discretion of each county clerk.43
The most obvious reason states would adopt laws allowing 
citizen monitoring functions is to increase the resources dedicated 
to election oversight by bringing private actors into the process.  
Where election administrators operate with limited staffs and 
budgets, private parties can increase the scrutiny of elections 
processes and improve the chances errors or fraud will be 
identified.  But this is not the only reason offered for the existence 
of private party monitoring laws.  A report from Project Vote, an 
affiliate of ACORN,44 describes the origin of private monitoring 
 36. Id. at 19–21.  
 37. Id.; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 434-261-020 (West 2007). 
 38. McDonald, 153 Wash. 2d at 206. 
 39. Motion for Clarification of Respondent at 1, In re Thomas M. Salmon, No. 
714-11-06 (Vt. Wash. County Ct. Nov. 7, 2006). 
 40. In re Thomas M. Salmon, No. 714-11-06, at 3 (Vt. Wash County Ct. Nov. 
21, 2006) (order for statewide recount). 
 41. Motion for Clarification of Respondent, supra note 39, at 1. 
 42. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2602(a) (2002 & Supp. 2007); In re Thomas M. 
Salmon, supra note 40, at 2. 
 43. In re Thomas M. Salmon, No. 714-11-06 (Vt. Wash. County Ct. Dec. 5, 
2006) (entry regarding motion). 
 44. See ACORN’s Links to Related Organizations, http://www.acorn.org/ 
index.php?id=4143 (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).  These organizations also work 
from the same address in Washington, D.C.  See http://www.projectvote.org 
(address for Project Vote) (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); http://www.acorn.org/ 
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statutes in more sinister terms: “History demonstrates that laws 
allowing private citizens to challenge other citizens’ right to vote at 
the polls are a relic of the Jim Crow era, a means to preserve private 
and partisan control over elections.  As such they should be 
eliminated or tightly regulated.”45
It may be true that some states adopted private election 
monitoring statutes for reasons less noble than preserving the 
integrity of the process.46  But the presence of states in New 
England (Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island) and on 
the west coast (California and Washington) among those that allow 
challenges at some point during the process indicates that more 
factors are at work than residual Jim Crow influences. 
Private monitoring statutes permit some or all of three 
practices.  The first is allowing private actors to challenge voter 
registrations before election day.47  Such challenges, if successful, 
have the effect of removing the challenged voter from the 
registration rolls and preventing him or her from casting a ballot.48  
The second form of private monitoring is granting private actors 
standing to challenge voters in person at a polling place.49  The 
means of adjudicating these challenges and the effect if they 
succeed vary widely from state to state, including barring the voter 
from casting a ballot and requiring them to vote using a provisional 
ballot subject to later review.50  The third way states allow private 
participation is allowing private actors to challenge absentee ballots 
at the verification stage, before they are removed from their outer 
envelopes and tabulated.51
E. Other Provisions for Private Monitoring and Enforcement 
The concept of employing interested private parties to expand 
enforcement efforts is not unique to elections.  In fact, it is widely 
index.php?id=4318 (address for District of Columbia office of ACORN) (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2007). 
 45. Teresa James, Caging Democracy: A 50-Year History of Partisan Challenges to 
Minority Voters, PROJECT VOTE, Sept. 2007, at 34, available at http://projectvote.org/ 
fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/Caging_Democracy_Report.pdf. 
 46. See id. at 7 (stating many state voter challenge laws have roots in the post-
Reconstructionist Era). 
 47. See infra Part II. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See infra Part III. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See infra Part IV. 
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employed in other areas of law.  Private citizens can sue on behalf 
of the government to recoup fraudulently obtained payments 
under the False Claims Act.52  Individual workers can file suits to 
remedy violations of the Davis-Bacon Act’s prevailing wage rules.53  
The federal do-not-call statute allows individuals who receive calls 
in violation of the rules to sue the offending party for statutory 
damages separate from any enforcement action the government 
may undertake.54  And under CERCLA, individuals may seek 
payments from liable polluters.55  This list is hardly comprehensive. 
Only four states—Alabama, Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Wyoming—prohibit the three private monitoring practices under 
discussion.56  The others all, in various ways, give private parties 
official standing to enforce election policies.57  In fact, twelve 
states—Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
and Wisconsin—permit private parties to act in all three ways: 
challenging voter registrations before an election, challenging 
voters at the polls, and challenging absentee ballots.58
II. PRE-ELECTION REGISTRATION CHALLENEGES 
One of the most extensive and bitterly contested uses of the 
right to challenge voter registrations before an election took place 
in Washington state in 2005.  As a direct result, the state legislature 
made substantial changes to Washington’s law governing pre-
election challenges the following year.59  Twenty-nine states permit 
pre-election challenges, subject to a wide range of time limitations 
and procedures.60
A. Washington State Registration Challenges in 2005 
King County is the largest county in Washington, with nearly 
one-third of the state’s population.61  It was also the epicenter of the 
 52. 31 U.S.C. § 3730b (2000). 
 53. 40 U.S.C. § 3144a(2) (effective Aug. 21, 2002). 
 54. 47 U.S.C. § 227b(3) (2000). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000). 
 56. See infra notes 91, 122, and 188. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See infra Part II.B. 
 60. See infra note 91. 
 61. See King County Quick Facts, U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts. 
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dispute over the 2004 governor’s election, which led to two 
recounts and an election contest trial that lasted until June of 
2005.62  Following that dispute, the King County Republican Party 
sought to correct some of the flaws it believed still existed in the 
county’s election system before the election for county executive 
on November 8, 2005.63
Washington permits any registered voter to challenge another 
voter’s registration before an election.64  The King County 
Republicans decided to use this right in an effort to correct errors 
on the county’s voter registration rolls.  They first challenged 
approximately two thousand registrations they believed were 
duplicates, representing the same voter registered more than 
once.65  Duplicate registrations are a substantial concern in 
Washington because the state allows voters to select a permanent 
no-excuse absentee status.66  Voters in that status automatically 
receive a ballot by mail for each election.67  So, if a voter has more 
than one registration that voter will receive more than one ballot, 
with each appearing to be sent and returned legitimately. 
The next step for the King County Republicans came on 
October 26, when they submitted a second list of challenges.  This 
list included 1944 names and was based on the claim that the 
addresses on the registrations were not legitimate residences but 
instead storage facilities or private mailbox services.68
Democrats vigorously opposed the registration challenges.  
The Democratic chairman of the County Council, Larry Phillips, 
asked County Prosecutor Norm Maleng to explore perjury charges 
against the person who signed the challenge forms, King County 
GOP Vice Chairwoman Lori Sotelo, claiming Sotelo lacked 
personal knowledge that the voters did not live at the addresses 
census.gov/qfd/states/53/53033.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).  The 2000 
census counted 1,737,034 people living in King County and 5,894,121 in 
Washington state.  Id. 
 62. See Timothy Egan, Washington Candidate Wages Endless Campaign, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2005, at A13. 
 63. Sharon Pian Chan, GOP Questions More Registrations, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2005, at B2. 
 64. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.820 (2006). 
 65. Keith Ervin & Justin Mayo, Voter Names Found Twice, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2005, at B1. 
 66. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.040 (2005). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Gregory Roberts, Challenging the GOP Challenge in King County, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 15, 2005, at B2. 
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where they were registered.69  A Democratic lawyer argued that the 
challenges should be dismissed without hearings.70  County 
Democratic chair Susan Sheary said the challenges infringed on 
voters’ civil rights.71
After some of the challenges were found to have been filed in 
error, the Republicans withdrew 140 of them.72  Meanwhile, 
reporters investigated thirty addresses that accounted for more 
than one thousand of the challenged registrations, and found that 
twenty-nine of them were in fact private mailbox services as claimed 
by the Republicans; the remaining address had already been 
identified as an error and was included in the 140 challenges 
previously withdrawn.73
Further investigation by the media uncovered some additional 
errors in the original list, most caused by challenging voters whose 
street number and street name were the same as a storage facility 
with the same street number and street name in another area or 
city.74  The chairman of the state Republican party, Chris Vance, 
acknowledged that the party’s data analyst had not compared cities 
or geographic designations when matching voter registration 
addresses to storage facility and private mail box facility addresses.75  
By the time challenge hearings began, the original list of 1944 was 
reduced by 176 withdrawn challenges, seventy-six duplicate entries, 
and over 200 voters who changed their registration addresses 
before the election deadline.76  With those deductions, roughly 
three-quarters of the challenges remained. 
The first hearings on the challenges were held November 17, 
2005.77  At the hearings, Democratic lawyers argued that state law 
required individuals challenging voters to attest not only that the 
voter did not live at the address where he or she was registered, but 
 69. Eric Pryne, GOP Not Dropping Voter Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2005, at B4. 
 70. See Roberts, supra note 68, at B2. 
 71. Eric Pryne, Voter-Challenge Errors Mount, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at 
B1 [hereinafter Pryne, Errors Mount]. 
 72. Eric Pryne, GOP Admits it Erred in Challenging Some Voters’ Registration, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at A1. 
 73. Eric Pryne, Parties Clash Over Voter Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, 
at B1. 
 74. See Pryne, Errors Mount, supra note 71, at B1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See More Mistakes in Voter Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at B3. 
 77. See Sam Skolnik, GOP Registration Objections Receive More Scrutiny; Few Voters 
Show Up to Plead Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 18, 2005, at B1. 
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also to provide the voter’s true address.78  The county canvassing 
board first considered 192 challenges to registrations where the 
voter cast a ballot in the November 8, 2005 election.79  The board 
rejected three-fourths of the challenges, upholding only those 
where voters themselves provided information showing they did 
not live at the address where they were registered.80  The county’s 
election director said that he voted to reject the challenges because 
the challenger “did not prove conclusively that [the] voters [did] 
not live at the addresses” where they were registered,81 effectively 
endorsing the argument made by the lawyer for the Democratic 
Party.  At the same time, he acknowledged that it appeared most of 
the challenged voters were in fact registered at private mailbox or 
storage facilities.82  After the canvassing board’s action on the 
challenges for voters who had cast ballots, the remaining 
challenges were left to be resolved administratively by the elections 
director.83
B. Legislative Response to Washington Registration Challenges 
The errors in handling the challenges and the politically 
charged atmosphere when they were filed put the focus on the 
challenge process rather than on the registrations.  In response, 
the Washington Legislature revised the challenge process in its 
2006 session.84  The revisions preserved the right to challenge 
registrations, but imposed substantial new burdens on the 
challenger.85
Under the new Washington challenge provisions, a challenge 
to a registration because the voter does not live at the residential 
 78. Eric Pryne, GOP May Need to Find Homes of Contested Voters, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2005, at B1. 
 79. See Gregory Roberts, Most Challenges on Voters Tossed: Ballots Will Now Be 
Counted, Unlikely to Change Results, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 29, 2005, at 
B1. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Eric Pryne, Most Challenged Ballots are Cleared to be Counted, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2005, at B1. 
 83. See Eric Pryne, Maleng: Voter Rolls Flawed, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at 
B1. 
 84. Act Relating to Modifying Processes for Challenging Voter Registration, 
2006 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 320 (S.S.B. 6362) (West), available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/200506/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Law%20200/
6362-S.sl.pdf. 
 85. Id. 
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address provided must include one of two specific elements.  The 
first is the challenged voter’s actual address.86  The second is 
evidence of due diligence, demonstrated by following all of five 
steps: sending a letter with return receipt requested, visiting the 
address and interviewing persons there, searching telephone 
directories, searching property records, and searching the 
statewide voter registration database.87  Imposing these 
requirements means that cost factors will make large-scale 
challenges such as those filed in 2005 almost impossible in the 
future, even where there is evidence the registration addresses are 
per se invalid (for example, by reason of being private mailbox 
facilities that cannot serve as a residence).  The bill did clarify the 
requirement that registrations include the actual physical residence 
of the voter.88
The Washington Legislature also required that challenges be 
filed sooner.  For existing registrations, challenges must now be 
filed at least 45 days before an election.89  For new registrations 
submitted less than 60 days before an election, the challenge must 
be filed at least 10 days before the election.90
C. State Laws on Pre-election Challenges 
Twenty-nine states permit private-party challenges of voter 
registrations before Election Day.91  In six of these—California, 
Georgia, Ohio, Texas, Washington and West Virginia—pre-
 86. Id. at § 4. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at § 2. 
 89. Id. at § 5. 
 90. Id. 
 91. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2213 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-101(1) (2000 & 
Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 2012 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 101.111(3) (2002 
& Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-229 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-25(a) 
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-431 (2001); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-12 (2003); IOWA 
CODE § 48A.14(1) (1999 & Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-602(a) 
(2002 & Supp. 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 48 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
168.512 (1989); MINN. STAT. § 201.195 subdiv. 1 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-63 
(2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-301(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.547 (2002); 
N.M. STAT. § 1-4-22 (2004); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-218 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
85(a) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24(a) (2007); 25 PA. STAT. § 1329(a) 
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-9.1-28(a) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-230 (1977 & 
Supp. 2006); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 16.091(2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-202 
(2003 & Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-431 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 
29A.08.810 (2005 & Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE § 3-2-28(a) (2006); WIS. STAT. § 
6.48(1)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2006). 
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registration challenges are the only private party role allowed; 
polling place and absentee ballot challenges are not permitted.92  A 
few states restrict the time when pre-election challenges may be 
filed.  Colorado allows them no later than sixty days before an 
election.93  In Florida, any elector may challenge another voter’s 
right to vote not sooner than thirty days before the election (but 
the challenged voter may still cast a provisional ballot).94  Nevada 
allows registration challenges only between thirty and twenty-five 
days before an election.95  New Mexico requires challenges to be 
made at least forty-two days before an election,96 and North 
Carolina at least twenty-five days.97  The deadline in Ohio is not 
later than twenty days before the election,98 and in Utah it is two 
business days before the start of voting.99  Along with Washington, 
whose time for challenges was changed to forty-five days before the 
election for existing registrations and ten days before for new 
registrations100 after the 2005 challenges discussed above,101 these 
are the only states that impose time limits on their pre-registration 
challenges. 
In a sign of concern about large-scale challenges, New York 
requires that each challenge affidavit may refer to only one voter 
registration.102  Some states also ban malicious or frivolous 
challenges, or impose a probable cause standard.103
III. POLLING PLACE CHALLENEGES 
Challenges to voter registrations address questions about voter 
eligibility before election day.  In thirty-nine states, private parties—
usually the established political parties—are allowed through 
 92. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2213 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-229 (2003); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24(a) (2007); 25 PA. STAT. § 1329(a) (2007); W. VA. 
CODE § 3-2-28(a), (b) (2006). 
 93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-101(1)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2007). 
 94. FLA. STAT. § 101.111(3) (2002 & Supp. 2007). 
 95. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.547 (2002). 
 96. N.M. STAT. § 1-4-22(A) (2004). 
 97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-85(a) (2006). 
 98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 3503.24 (A) (2007). 
 99. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-202(2)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 100. Act of June 7, 2006, ch. 320, § 5, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws. 
 101. See supra Part II.A. 
 102. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-220(1) (2007). 
 103. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.111(4) (2002 & Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS     
§ 168.512 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE 29A.08.810 (2005 & Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE      
§ 3-9-7 (2006). 
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designated individuals to challenge a voter on election day when 
the voter appears at a polling place to cast a ballot.104  Many states 
appear to treat pre-election registration challenges and polling 
place challenges as alternative, rather than complementary, tools.  
Twenty-two states allow one or the other, but not both.105
In one documented incident from 2007, a polling place 
challenger blocked an attempt to impersonate a voter in Hoboken, 
New Jersey.106  The Hoboken incident demonstrated two theoretical 
justifications for polling place challengers: they can bring 
information and resources to bear that election officials cannot, 
and valid voter registration may be used by someone other than the 
registered voter to cast a ballot. 
In advance of the 2004 presidential election, the parties 
prepared an extensive plan to station challengers in polling places 
in Ohio under the provisions of the state’s election code.107  The 
Democrats filed three lawsuits trying to bar challengers from the 
Ohio polls despite their statutory right to be there,108 and those 
 104. ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.210 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-590 (2006); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-312 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-201 (West Supp. 2007); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-232 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4934 (1999); FLA. 
STAT. § 101.111 (West Supp. 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-25 (2006); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 34-304 (Supp. 2007); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-23 (Supp. 2007); IND. CODE 
§ 3-10-1-9 (2006); IOWA CODE § 49.79 (Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
117.315(3) (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:565 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 673 (Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-311 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 85A (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
168.730 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 204C.12 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-571 
(2007); MO. STAT. § 115.429(2) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-301 (2007); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-926 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.287(2) (2002); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 659:27, 666:4–:5 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:7 (West Supp. 2007); 
N.M. STAT. § 1-2-21 (2003); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-502 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 163-87 (Supp. 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-06 (Supp. 2007); 25 PA. 
STAT. § 2687(b) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-22 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-
810 (Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-6.3 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-
104(c) (Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN.  § 20A-3-202 (Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17 § 2564 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-651 (Supp. 2007); WIS. STAT. § 6.925 
(2004). 
 105. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and 
West Virginia. 
 106. See infra Part III.A. 
 107. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004), stay 
granted, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21, as it existed before the legislative 
changes described in Part III.C infra, stated: “At any primary, special, or general 
election, any political party . . . may appoint to any of the polling places in the 
16
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suits were not resolved until a few hours before the polls opened.109  
As happened in Washington after the 2005 pre-election registration 
challenges, the Ohio legislature stepped in and rewrote the state’s 
election statute in the wake of the 2004 disputes.110  Among the 
states that allow polling place challengers, there are many 
differences in the procedure for making a challenge and the effect 
if one is upheld.111
A. Hoboken, NJ—Anatomy of a Fraud 
On June 12, 2007, the city of Hoboken, New Jersey held a 
runoff election in the primary for the city council.112  That morning, 
John Branciforte—a former zoning board president and nineteen-
year resident of the city—was on his way to volunteer as an election 
challenger at a polling place when he noticed two men standing in 
a semi-circle of seven other men and handing out 3x5 index 
cards.113  One of the men who had received a card later entered the 
polling place where Branciforte was volunteering and signed in to 
vote.114  Branciforte challenged him, and a city worker asked the 
man for identification, which prompted the man attempting to 
vote to leave abruptly.115  Branciforte followed him and called 
police.116
According to a police report, the man lived in a homeless 
shelter and had signed in to vote in another person’s name 
(Branciforte had suspected the index cards contained names of 
registered voters and that the men receiving the cards were 
instructed to impersonate them at the polls).117  The man told 
police that someone had come to the shelter that morning and 
asked men outside if they wanted to make ten dollars.118
county or city one person, a qualified elector, who shall serve as a challenger for 
such party . . . .” 
 109. See infra Part III.B. 
 110. See infra Part III.C. 
 111. See infra Part III.D. 
 112. Madeline Friedman & Caren Lissner, Anatomy of Voter Fraud; Will Officials 
Follow Up on Alleged $10 Vote Payoff?, HUDSON REP. (Hudson County, NJ, July 1, 
2007), available at http://www.hudsonreporter.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=18535 
598. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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Apparently, Branciforte’s intervention prevented the homeless 
man from impersonating a voter at the polls.119  Based on what 
Branciforte observed on his way to the polling place, it also seems 
likely that there was an effort to enlist others in the same practice.120  
The candidate Branciforte was working for on Election Day and his 
opponent both said they believed this incident was part of a larger 
attempt by local political party organizations to influence the 
election outcome.121
This incident illustrates the positive side of polling place voter 
challenges.  Branciforte was able to prevent a fraudulent vote based 
on his own knowledge and observations.  Had he not been present, 
there is no indication that the city election workers would have 
challenged the person attempting to vote in someone else’s name. 
B. Ohio 2004—Deadlock Over Challengers 
Again, thirty-nine states allow private actors to challenge voters 
in the polling place on election day122 and Ohio is one of them.    
Leading up to the November 2, 2004 election, the two major 
political parties arranged for several hundred challengers in one 
Ohio county alone (Hamilton County, which includes the city of 
Cincinnati).123  On October 27, two voters in Hamilton County filed 
a suit in federal court in Cincinnati seeking to block the 
Republicans’ polling place challengers.124  The next day, Democrats 
filed another federal suit in Cleveland, also seeking to enjoin the 
Republican challenger program.125  In a period of seven days from 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra note 104. 
 123. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004), stay 
granted, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 124. See id. at 529; see also Cindi Andrews, Dems Want Challengers Out, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2004, at 1C (reporting on testimony in the Spencer 
case, including Hamilton County Democratic co-chairman Tim Burke’s concerns 
that Republicans were targeting black voters); Gregory Korte, Dlott Rulings Could 
Impact Vote, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2004, at 1A (reporting on status of 
court cases over Republican efforts to combat alleged voter fraud, including 
lawsuit by longtime Cincinnati civil rights leaders Marian and Donald Spencer).  
 125. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, No. 
5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539 at *3-5 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004), stay 
granted, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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the time the first case was filed, these two cases generated seven 
opinions, including two from the Supreme Court.126
In the first case to be decided, the court explicitly weighed the 
state’s compelling interest in preventing election fraud against the 
potential harm to the voters being challenged.127  The court 
determined that the polling place challenger provisions were not 
narrowly drawn to serve the state’s compelling interest for two 
primary reasons: the availability of pre-election challenges by 
private actors, and the presence of election officials in the polling 
place.128
The district court in the second case reached a similar 
conclusion, also holding that the election day challenger statute 
was not narrowly drawn and therefore excessively burdened the 
right to vote.129  The court emphasized the ability of official election 
judges to protect against fraud, the role of the Board of Elections 
in screening registration applications to ensure only valid ones are 
processed, and the availability of pre-election private party 
challenges.130  The court also observed that the secretary of state 
and attorney general were in dispute over the role of private party 
challengers.131  On October 29, the secretary of state announced 
that he would recommend banning private challengers from 
polling places,132 while the attorney general countered that his duty 
was to uphold the challenger statute as enacted by the legislature.133
With less than eight hours remaining before the polls were 
scheduled to open, a panel of the Third Circuit upheld a district 
court order in yet a third path of litigation, enjoining Ohio 
Republicans from using lists prepared before election day as the 
basis for challenging voters in polling places.134  The circuit court 
 126. See Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301 (2004); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. 
Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 04-4186, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22687 (3d Cir. Nov. 
1, 2004), reh’g granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22689 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2004), stay 
denied, 543 U.S. 1304 (2004); Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm., 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539; Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 528–38. 
 127. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22539 at *20–21. 
 128. Id. at *21. 
 129. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (“How can the average election official or inexperienced challenger 
be expected to understand the challenge process if the two top election officials 
cannot?”). 
 132. Id. at 532. 
 133. Id. at 536–37. 
 134. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 04-4186, 2004 
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then granted a petition for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel’s 
order, and stayed the district court’s injunction.135
Meanwhile, a panel of the Sixth Circuit heard a consolidated 
appeal of the Spencer and Summit County cases.136  The court granted 
an emergency stay of the district court orders pending further 
appeal, using an analytical approach different than that of the 
district courts.137  In the Sixth Circuit’s view, the plaintiffs were 
unlikely to prevail on the threshold question of whether the 
presence of challengers burdens the right to vote, because 
“[c]hallengers may only initiate an inquiry process by precinct 
judges” while the precinct judges made the final decision on the 
voter’s status.138  Recognizing that it was a close case, the court 
weighed the balance in favor of leaving the statutory provisions for 
private challengers in place: 
[I]f the plaintiffs are not correct in their view of the law, 
the State will be irreparably injured in its ability to execute 
valid laws, which are presumed constitutional, for keeping 
ineligible voters from voting. . . . It is particularly harmful 
to such interests to have the rules changed at the last 
minute.139
The plaintiffs in both the Third and Sixth Circuit cases asked 
the Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals orders 
overturning the district courts.  Justice Stevens denied the 
application in the consolidated Spencer and Summit County cases in 
large part because it was impossible as a practical matter for the 
Court to review and rule upon the case materials in the limited 
time available before the polls opened.140  In the Democratic National 
Committee v. Republican National Committee case, Justice Souter 
denied the application for stay when the lone individual voter who 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22687 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 2004), vacated, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22689 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (en banc). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 
F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 137. See id. at 550 (reasoning that the factors to be considered in determining 
whether an order should be stayed are the same factors used to determine 
whether to issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction). 
 138. Id. at 551. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2004). 
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was party to the case filed a pleading with the Court disclosing that 
she had already voted without challenge.141
When voting proceeded on November 2 after this epic flurry 
of litigation, the incumbent President George W. Bush defeated 
John Kerry in Ohio by 118,601 votes, 2,859,768 to 2,741,167, 
securing Ohio’s electoral votes and the presidency for a second 
term.142  Years later, Democrats continue to argue that Bush’s Ohio 
victory was procured through fraud.143
C. Legislative Response to Dispute Over Ohio Poll Challengers 
Following the extensive litigation over polling place 
challengers in 2004, the Ohio Legislature enacted significant 
changes to the state’s laws governing election day challenges.144  
The legislature required pre-election challenges by private parties 
to be brought no later than twenty days before an election.145  More 
dramatically, the legislature abolished private challengers in 
polling places, replacing all references to challengers with the term 
“observers.”146  The revised law allows only election judges to 
challenge voters at the polls on election day.147  As a counterbalance 
to shutting out private actors from election day challenges, the 
legislature required election officials to mail a nonforwardable 
piece of mail to each registered voter before each election.148  If the 
 141. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 543 U.S. 1304, 1304 
(2004). 
 142. Official Results 2004, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ElectionsVoter/ 
results2004.aspx?Section=135 (last visited Nov. 20, 2007). 
 143. See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Was the 2004 Election Stolen?, ROLLING 
STONE, June 1, 2006, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/10432 
334/was_the_2004_election_stolen (quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd, Democrat of 
Connecticut, as saying Ohio’s Republican secretary of state “was determined to 
guarantee a Republican outcome.”). 
 144. Act of Jan. 31, 2006, No. 65, § 1, 2006 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. L-2 (West), 
available at  http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/JournalText126/HJ-01-31-06.pdf. 
 145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24 (West 2007). 
 146. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (West 2007): 
At any primary, special, or general election, any political party supporting 
candidates to be voted upon at such election and any group of five or 
more candidates may appoint to the board of elections or to any of the 
precincts in the county or city one person, a qualified elector, who shall 
serve as observer for such party or such candidates during the casting and 
counting of the ballots . . . . 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
 147. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2006), invalidated by Boustani v. 
Blackwell, 460 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.19(A) (West 2007). 
21
Schalestock: Monitoring of Election Processes by Private Actors
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
SCHALESTOCK - ADC 2/3/2008  2:27:00 PM 
584 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
mail is returned, voters will be required to show identification the 
next time they attempt to vote.149
Even though Ohio’s legislative changes eliminate private 
challengers at the polls, some activists have treated the new 
legislation as if it were designed to make it easier to challenge 
voters.  A former lawyer in the Justice Department’s voting rights 
section said the changes “make one wonder whether there will be 
new efforts to have massive challenges in the future.”150
D. Procedures Governing Polling Place Challenges 
In addition to challengers, who have official standing to 
participate in the election process by raising challenges, almost all 
states allow observers in polling places.151
The effect of a challenge varies from state to state.  In Arizona, 
if a majority of the polling place’s election board decides that a 
challenge is valid, the voter casts a provisional ballot instead of a 
regular ballot.152  That process gives the voter a second bite at the 
apple, creating an opportunity for a ballot to be counted if the 
provisional ballot is deemed valid. 
When a voter is challenged at the polls in Hawaii, the 
challenge is immediately considered and decided by the election 
officials in the precinct.153  If the officials uphold the challenge, the 
voter either is prevented from voting or may appeal the decision to 
the board of registration.154  For an appeal, the voter completes a 
ballot that is sealed in an envelope to be reviewed by the board and 
counted or not depending on the board’s ruling (the functional 
equivalent of a provisional ballot).155
In Maine, a challenged voter casts a ballot that is counted with 
the regular ballots but marked with a number that is recorded on a 
“challenge certificate” and kept sealed with the voting materials.156  
The word “challenged” also is marked next to the voter’s name on 
 149. § 3501.19(C). 
 150. Greg Gordon, States’ New Laws Help GOP Raise Voter Challenges, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 27, 2007, at A1. 
 151. West Virginia prohibits anyone other than election officers or voters 
going to or from the election room to vote to be within 300 feet of the entrance to 
the polling place.  W. VA. CODE § 3-1-37(a) (2006). 
 152. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-592(C) (2006). 
 153. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-25(b) (2006). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 673(3) (Supp. 2006). 
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the precinct roster.157  After the election, if the challenged ballots 
could affect the outcome, the challenge certificates are unsealed 
and a determination of the challenges is made.158  Wisconsin also 
marks a serial number directly on a challenged ballot.159
A challenged voter in Michigan or Minnesota is asked a series 
of questions by a precinct election official to determine his or her 
qualifications.160  If the official determines based on the answers 
that the voter is not qualified to vote in that precinct, the person is 
not entitled to receive a ballot and vote.161
When a challenge is upheld in New Mexico, the voter 
completes a ballot that is placed in an envelope with the word 
“rejected” and the voter’s name written on the outside.162  The 
envelope is then placed in the ballot box and not counted.163  A 
similar procedure applies in Tennessee.164  If a voter is challenged 
successfully in Vermont, the voter is denied access to the voting 
area and cannot vote except by obtaining a court order before the 
polls close.165
IV. ABSENTEE BALLOT CHALLENEGES 
Following a series of indictments for absentee ballot fraud in 
2007, an official in Hale County, Alabama, credited the presence of 
political party monitors in the elections office with reducing the 
number of absentee ballots cast, many of which were presumed 
fraudulent.166  This is one example of private party monitoring 
having an effect on the voting process, even where the Alabama 
monitors did not have the right to challenge the absentee ballots.167  
Although challenging absentee ballots is conceptually similar to 
challenging voters at a polling place, the actual practice and 
process is different because of the way absentee ballots are 
 157. Id. § 673(3-A). 
 158. Id. § 696(1). 
 159. WIS. ADMIN. CODE EL. § 6.95 (Supp. 2006). 
 160. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.729 (2005); MINN. STAT. § 204C.12 subdiv. 3 
(Supp. 2007). 
 161. MICH. COMP. LAWS  § 168.729 (2005); § 204C.12, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2007). 
 162. N.M. STAT. § 1-12-22(A) (2003). 
 163. Id. 
 164. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-125 (2003). 
 165. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2564 (2002). 
 166. Stephanie Taylor, Two Accused of Voter Fraud In Hale County, TUSCALOOSA 
NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/ 
20070817/LATEST/70817026. 
 167. ALA. CODE § 17-11-11(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
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handled.  Relatively few states—twenty-two—permit challenges of 
absentee ballots,168 and the choice of whether to allow the practice 
does not seem to correlate to the proportion of a state’s votes that 
are cast by absentee.169
A. Monitors Making a Difference in Alabama 
In Greensboro, Alabama, two people—one a former city 
council member—were indicted on August 16, 2007 on charges 
related to absentee ballot fraud.170  The allegations involved the 
casting of apparently fraudulent absentee ballots in two Democratic 
primary elections in Alabama’s Hale County.171
One of those elections was a May 2005 primary for an open 
seat in the state house of representatives.172  Candidate Ralph 
Howard surpassed opponent Albert Turner, Jr. in Hale County by a 
vote of 2264 to 1380.173  But while only forty-three of Howard’s 2264 
votes were cast by absentee ballot, Turner received 813 of his 1380 
votes by absentee.174
When he announced the charges, Alabama Attorney General 
Troy King said that Hale County had a history of problems: “Very 
rarely do we have elections in Hale County that we do not receive 
complaints . . . .  This has been a systemic problem of 
corruption.”175  Nonetheless, even before the indictments were filed 
there were signs that the situation might be improving.  A clerk in 
the county probate judge’s office said the number of absentee 
ballots cast had been declining since 2000, falling from thousands 
per election to only 300 in the most recent.176  Most interestingly, 
the clerk said that one factor in the decrease was the presence of 
poll watchers from candidates and political parties in the absentee 
vote office during the five weeks it was open.177
Only a few days before the Alabama indictments, a report 
emerged in neighboring Mississippi that more than 30% of the 
 168. See infra note 188. 
 169. See infra Part IV.B. 
 170. Taylor, supra note 167. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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absentee ballots cast in an August 2007 election were fraudulent.178  
The issue was taken seriously enough that the ballots were 
transported to a state crime lab and analyzed for DNA and 
fingerprints.179
A few months later, a commissioner in Refugio County, Texas, 
resigned after admitting to a fraud scheme involving absentee 
ballots in his 2006 election.180  He was reported to have had county 
residents sign absentee ballot applications that were sent to his 
supporters and then signed by the applicants after being 
completed.181
B. The Different Challenge of Monitoring Absentees 
The Alabama and Mississippi examples cited above illustrate 
problems that can arise in casting absentee ballots and how 
monitors or challengers could seek to identify and prevent them.  
Nationwide 12% of ballots were cast by absentee ballot in 2004,182 
but some states—especially in the West—had absentee rates that 
were much higher: 68.7% in Washington, 40.8% in Arizona 
(including both absentee and early votes, which are cast using the 
same process), 33.2% in California (accounting for over four 
million ballots), and 100% in Oregon, the nation’s only all vote-by-
mail state.183
The types of activities that challengers can monitor for 
absentee ballots are different than those at polling places.  In 
absentee processing, ballots are handled by election officials at a 
central office, but they are handled for an extended period of 
time.184  Ballot accountability—reconciling the number of tabulated 
ballots to the number of legitimate voters casting them—can be far 
more complex for tens or hundreds of thousands of absentee 
ballots in a central office than for a few hundred ballots in a 
 178. Andy Wise, Tunica County Ballot Investigation Targets Circuit Clerk’s Office, 
WREG-TV (Memphis), Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1887759/posts (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Tara Bozick, Refugio Commissioner Admits to Voter Fraud:  Commissioner 
Resigns, Pleads Guilty to State Jail Felony, VICTORIA ADVOCATE, Oct. 11, 2007, available 
at 2007 WLNR 19836561. 
 181. Id. 
 182. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-6. 
 183. Id. at 4–7. 
 184. GARBER, supra note 7, at 23.  
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precinct polling place.185  Absentee voting often is cited as the most 
likely source of election fraud.186
C. Absentee Ballot Challenge Rules in the States 
Compared to the twenty-nine states that allow pre-election 
registration challenges and the thirty-nine that allow election day 
challenges at polling places, a smaller number—twenty-two—
permit challenges to absentee ballots.187  The states that allow the 
practice do not seem to base the choice on the percentage of their 
ballots cast by absentee.  The table below shows the states allowing 









 185. The failure to perform an accurate absentee ballot reconciliation figured 
prominently in the election contest litigation following the 2004 Washington 
governor’s election.  Keith Ervin, Election Manager Linked to False Report, SEATTLE 
TIMES, May 19, 2005, at B1; Keith Ervin, Higher-up Linked to Flawed Report, SEATTLE 
TIMES, May 21, 2005, at B1; Keith Ervin, King County Ballot Numbers Don’t Add Up, 
SEATTLE TIMES, May 25, 2005, at A16. 
 186. See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL 
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY (2006), at 9, available at 
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/reports-and-surveys2006electioncrimes. 
pdf/attachment_download/file; CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTION MGMT & 
AM. UNIV., BLDG. CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005), at 46, available at 
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf. 
 187. ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.203 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-552 (2006); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-312 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT.  § 9-159p(a) (2002); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5513 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 101.6104 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 
101.68(2)(c)(2) (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1009 (2001); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/19-10 (Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE § 49.79 (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.087 
(LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1315 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21-A, § 757 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 96 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS  
§ 168.769a (West 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.105 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
659:51 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 1-6-25 (West 2003); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-506 (Mckinney 
2007); 25 PA. STAT. § 3146.8(e) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-810 (1976); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 2-7-104(c) (2003); WIS. STAT. § 7.41 (West 2004); WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
El. Bd. § 9.04 (2007), WIS. ADMIN. CODE El. Bd 9.05 (West 2007). Oregon is not 
included on the list because 100 percent of its votes are cast by mail; the state does 
allow challenges to those ballots.  OR. REV. STAT. § 253.700 (2003). 
 188. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 4–6. 
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National Average 12% 














South Carolina 0% 
 
Six of the twenty-two states are above the national average in 
percentage of votes cast by absentee, and sixteen are below the 
average.  They also represent a wide range of geography. 
The procedures for challenging absentee ballots vary less than 
those for challenging voters at the polls.  This may reflect in part 
the different nature of the events.  A poll challenger is faced with a 
voter who is present at the time to cast a ballot, and who may or 
may not come with identification or clear answers to questions to 
resolve the challenge.  The challenge must be resolved quickly to 
determine whether or not the voter can vote (or a provisional 
ballot can be accepted, which effectively puts off the challenge 
determination to a later date).  When an absentee ballot is 
challenged, the ballot is a fixed document, already containing 
information about the voter (otherwise it could not have been sent 
and returned successfully), and without an impatient voter present, 
there is time to evaluate and investigate the information available. 
Illinois allows poll watchers to observe the processing of 
absentee ballots and issue challenges, and the state also accounts 
for a unique aspect of absentee ballots: the signature match.189  Poll 
watchers in Illinois have a specific right to observe the election 
judges comparing the signature on the ballot envelope with the 
 189. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/19-10 (West 2003). 
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signature on the voter’s registration card.190  This allows them the 
opportunity to challenge not only based on the eligibility of the 
registered voter to cast a ballot, but also on a claim that the ballot 
was submitted by a person other than the registered voter 
(equivalent to the polling place impersonation in the Hoboken 
incident described earlier). 
Kentucky’s process for challenging absentee ballots includes 
an important time limitation.  All absentee ballot challenges must 
be in writing and in the county clerk’s possession by 10 a.m. on 
election day;191 however, absentee ballots will be counted if they are 
received by the time polls close.192  Consequently, a person wishing 
to challenge an absentee ballot either must make the challenge 
based solely on the request for the ballot, without knowing whether 
it was returned, or must forego the opportunity to challenge any 
ballots arriving on election day. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A large majority of states—forty-five—allow pre-election voter 
registration challenges, polling place challenges, or both, by 
private, non-governmental parties.  This represents a strong 
endorsement of private monitoring and enforcement processes by 
the states.  As the use of absentee ballots expands, the number of 
states allowing challenges to absentee ballots may grow from its 
current twenty-two to reach a majority as well. 
Private monitoring and enforcement can help identify errors 
and misconduct in elections, increasing the level of integrity 
beyond what government resources can provide.  It also 
acknowledges the role of key stakeholders in what is, at its core, an 
adversarial system. 
With high-profile, very close elections becoming frequent, the 
candidates and political parties whose success and—literally—
fortunes depend upon winning those elections are likely to look 
more and more to available private enforcement mechanisms as a 
tool for gaining the tiny edge they need to finish on top.  As the 
legislatures in Washington and Ohio showed, though, using private 
enforcement tools too aggressively can backfire by causing them to 
be restricted in the future. 
 190. Id. 
 191. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.087(1) (LexisNexis 2004). 
 192. Id. 
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